Mechanism Design: Properties of Allocation Mechanisms and Voting Rules

The ambition to design allocation mechanisms and voting rules that satisfy various desirable criteria (efficiency, strategy-proofness, fairness, equality, anonymity, neutrality, etc.) has a long tradition and also been high on the agenda of economic re...

The ambition to design allocation mechanisms and voting rules that satisfy various desirable criteria (efficiency, strategy-proofness, fairness, equality, anonymity, neutrality, etc.) has a long tradition and also been high on the agenda of economic research in recents decades. The research has been successful in characterizing various mechanisms in terms of their elementary properties, and thus made them transparent and comparable, but also pointed to the difficulty of constructing a mechanism with the capacity of simultaneously satisfying several such desirable criteria in general settings. Furthermore, the theoretical results have provided the foundation for the real life design of,

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